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1. Introduction
The presence of long-lasting conflicts in situations where reaching an agreement would benefit
all parties is a pervasive phenomenon. This paradoxical fact, pointed out by Hicks (1932) in
the context of strikes, has especially serious consequences when nations are engaged in war.
One of the most common sources of conflict is bargaining over a territory, present in both
secessionist movements as in international disputes1. This chapter aims to provide a rationale
to the "Hicks paradox" in a context where two countries are engaged in open conflict for a
territory. Although termination of the conflict (i.e. reaching a negotiated outcome) improves
the welfare of both parties, it is shown that when bargainers act rationally, the probability that
the conflict persists over time is positive.
There are two main ways in which the inefficiencies associated to delay in bargaining
are explained from a rational choice perspective: asymmetric information and dynamic
commitment problems2. The former invokes the existence of some sort of incomplete
information in the bargaining environment. For instance, states might prefer fighting instead
of achieving a peaceful settlement when there is uncertainty about the other’s cost of fighting.
The latter resorts to dynamic commitment problems whereby the players may face incentives
to renege on agreements. Our contribution belongs to the first category.
We propose a game-theoretic approach to understand the relationship between conflict, social
welfare and the likelihood that a negotiation process emerges. Although the problem we
tackle here is applicable to several bargaining contexts, for expositional purposes we conduct
our analysis through the example of an international dispute over territory3. In contrast
with the standard view of conflict as a bargaining tool (where the threat of war enhances
the bargaining power of the parties), we consider conflict as the status quo, and then focus
on the strategic elements that influence conflict termination. Our contribution is then very
related to the work of Wittman (1979), who envisions the end of war as a rational process.
The key element in our approach is that an inefficient outcome may arise as a consequence
of the parties’ ability to make public statements. When engaged in conflict, strong public
pronouncements against the other’s territorial claims undermine the possibilities of reaching
a mutually beneficial agreement. Why would then the parties make such statements? Our
1 For a survey of the theoretical work on bargaining and war, see Powell (2002).
2 See Fearon (1995).
3 Other contexts where our analysis would apply are: bargaining between a buyer and a seller, firm-union
negotiations, settlements out of court in legal disputes, etc.
  
Social Welfare and the Emergence  
of Negotiations 
Francisco Candel-Sánchez 
University of Murcia 
Spain 
10
www.intechopen.com
2 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
view is that countries use public claims as a rational strategy to better their position in a future
negotiation process.
The declaration of a position as an irreversible commitment4 is used as a tactical approach to
create a more advantageous bargaining environment. The politician who makes the claim
is implicitly committed with the public to fulfill the terms of the pronouncement. Such
statements are effective as they have the power to bind oneself. As Schelling (1956) argued:
When national representatives go to international negotiations knowing that there is a wide range of
potential agreement within which the outcome will depend on bargaining, they seem often to create a
bargaining position by public statements, statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permit
no concessions to be made. If a binding public opinion can be cultivated, and made evident to the other
side, the initial position can thereby be made visibly "final." p. 287.
We construct a formal model in which two agents bargain about how to divide the [0, 1]
interval (territory). There are two possibilities: either a negotiation process emerges and the
interval is divided according to a certain division rule, or the negotiation process does not take
place, and the countries must face conflict one more period. In the former case, the territory
is divided according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. If pre-bargaining public
statements are “too far” from each other, negotiations don’t start. Statements are represented
by numbers belonging to [0, 1]. We define a threshold T, whose value is uncertain to the
parties, to account for the distance about claims. If such a distance is above T, then neither
party is willing to negotiate. Uncertainty about T reflects the parties’ lack of information
about each other’s willingness to make concessions.
Countries are engaged in a game in which extreme claims lower the probability of a negotiated
outcome, but they also better their bargaining position in case a pacific settlement is to
be reached. The players must then calculate rationally their strategies in the absence of
information about the realization of the threshold T. We are posing a situation in which there
is a risk-return trade off between aggressive claims and diplomatic efforts (concessions) that
increase the likelihood of a negotiated outcome. Faced with this trade-off, the players’ optimal
strategy includes making statements that involve in some cases persistence of the conflict.
In order to achieve this result, we first characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibrium vector
of public statements. We find that there exists a set of parameters under which the conflict
continues with positive probability at equilibrium. Remarkably, this probability turns out
to be a non monotone function of the conflict costs. For low enough costs, the probability
of conflict is decreasing, then it reaches a minimum at a certain point and when costs go
beyond that point, it increases and converges asymptotically to a constant value. From this
pattern we can extract some conclusions. First, lowering the conflict costs may increase the
probability of conflict if such costs are low enough. Second, when conflict costs are sufficiently
high, variations on them have a negligible effect on the likelihood that a negotiation process
emerges.
The view of conflict termination presented here complements the usual approach to
bargaining and wars, whereby investing resources in military weapons is used as a credible
signal by countries wishing to convey certain private information to their opponents5. In our
4 Muthoo (1996) shows how commitments which can be reversed at a cost affect the players’ "share of
the cake" at equilibrium.
5 As in Kennan and Wilson (1993), delay can also be considered as a signal to convey private information
credibly.
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model, statements are costless6, but they entail consequences that affect the players’ welfare.
The players do not send revealing signals, although the strategic process that precedes
negotiation is characterized by imperfect information. A threshold whose value is uncertain
is introduced to account for all pieces of information that condition the likelihood of a pacific
settlement and are not perfectly known to both parties. In this informational environment, we
are able to characterize a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic model that incorporates
the main elements of our analysis. Section 3 characterizes the generalized Nash bargaining
solution assumed to prevail if negotiations are held. Section 4 is devoted to compute the
statements made by both countries in a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 5
investigates the welfare consequences of the equilibrium play of the countries, paying special
attention to the relationship between the conflict costs and the likelihood of a negotiation
process to emerge. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
We consider a dynamic infinite horizon model in which two countries7, L and R, are in conflict
over a piece of land of size 1. At any given period, the conflict can be resolved through
negotiation, or it can persist at least one more period. Formally, the players face a problem
consisting on how to reach an agreement about a division of the interval [0, 1]. This situation
is repeated every period until an agreement is reached.
At the beginning of each period, countries have the ability to make public statements about
their respective territory claims. After the statements are made, two possibilities emerge:
Either a negotiation process takes place, or the conflict continues. If the positions publicly
announced are "too far" from each other, then no negotiation process starts, and each party
i = L, H faces conflict costs Hi. This situation might occur, for instance, if pre bargaining
statements made by country L are regarded as unacceptable by country R.
The conflict cost is a parameter that influences the countries’ welfare and hence affects
their behavior. It reflects the resources lost in the conflict (guns, lives, etc.), or it can even
be interpreted as the cost of a delay in reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. Unlike
Sanchez-Pagés (2009) and Cramton and Tracy (1992), we consider that countries cannot choose
the intensity of the dispute (and hence, cannot affect the conflict costs).
The countries’ utilities after an agreement is reached are linear and given by uL(y) = θLy
and uR(y) = θR (1− y), where y ∈ [0, 1] denotes the piece of land that goes to country L if
the territorial status quo is modified through negotiation, and θi denotes country’s i = L, R
valuation of the territory gained. It is implicitly assumed that there is no initial owner of the
land. Therefore, the status quo refers to a situation in which the share of territory possessed
by each country is zero.
We analyze the strategic incentives faced by the conflicting parties before the possibility of
negotiations arises. In particular, we consider that countries use the tactical approach of
making public statements on y with the aim of creating a bargaining position. Let xi ∈ [0, 1]
be the public statement made by country i = L, R, where xL is the territory claim made by L
and 1− xR represents the territory claim of country R.
6 Croson et. al (2003) show through experiments that cheap talk in bargaining games have real effects,
both in the short and in the long run.
7 We use the terms "countries", "players" or "parties" indistinticly throughout the chapter.
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We define a threshold T, such that if xL − xR > T, negotiations don’t take place and conflict
continues. If xL − xR ≤ T, a bargaining process takes place whose final outcome is assumed
to be given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. In case negotiations don’t start,
the conflict is ongoing and each country i faces a cost Hi during the present period. At the
beginning of the next period, countries can make again public statements thus opening the
possibility of a negotiation in that period. The discount factor between periods is δ < 1.
We denote by Wi the expected utility of country i = L, R at the beginning of period t, and
usually refer to it as the social welfare. As long as all periods are identical, and we consider
an infinite time horizon, the game that starts in period t is identical to the game that starts in
period t + 1. This allows us to truncate the infinite horizon game and restrict our analysis to
the equilibrium strategies of any given period (say t). The equilibrium payoff of country i will
also be Wi at the beginning of period t + 1. Hence, using the discount factor between periods
we are able to derive endogenously the stationary equilibrium value of Wi. For notational
simplicity and wherever there is no risk of confusion, we omit time subscripts throughout the
chapter.
It is useful to define the utility achieved by country i = L, R, in case the conflict is prolonged
for n periods. This utility is given by:
din(Hi, Wi) = −
(
1− δn
1− δ
)
Hi + δ
nWi. (1)
The utility din represents the discounted conflict costs during n periods plus the discounted
expected utility at the beginning of period t + n + 1. Observe that din is strictly decreasing in
n. To see this, we just need to check that
∂din(Hi, Wi)
∂n
=
δ
n ln δ
1− δ Hi + δ
n ln δWi < 0, (2)
since δ < 1 and ln δ < 0. A quick inspection to Eq. (1) reveals that din(Hi, Wi) depends
negatively on Hi and positively on Wi.
A summary of the situation analyzed can be stated as follows: if at the beginning of period
t a negotiation process starts, the parties have the possibility of reaching an agreement on
the division of land. In the event that negotiations do not start (probably because the public
statements are too demanding), the conflict continues one more period and the payoff faced
by each country is di1(Hi, Wi) = −Hi + δWi, where δWi is the discounted value of the
expected utility at the beginning of period t + 1. In case negotiations take place, the final
outcome obtained corresponds to the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution8. This is a
classical axiomatic solution to bargaining problems, which we refer specifically to our context
in the next section.
3. Generalized Nash bargaining solution
We denote as αL and αR the bargaining power of countries L and R, with αL + αR = 1.
If a negotiation process takes place, either an agreement is reached, or negotiations end up
with a disagreement that involves returning to conflict again. A bargaining breakdown once
the parties have engaged in negotiations is a serious negative outcome. We assume that the
8 See Binmore (1987), Muthoo (1999) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a detailed discussion of the
Nash bargaining solution.
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consequence of such a breakdown is to suffer conflict along n more periods, until the parties
in conflict are again ready for dialogue. The number of periods of conflict, n, represents a
measure of the disagreement costs once the negotiations are underway.
The pair (dLn(HL, WL), dRn(HR, WR)) is the disagreement or threat point
9 in this bargaining
problem. The generalized Nash bargaining solution is then given by:
y˜(αL, αR) = arg max{y}
[y− dLn]αL [(1− y)− dRn]αR .
Solving the maximization problem stated above yields the following outcome:
y˜(αL, αR) = αL − αLdRn + αRdLn. (3)
The share of territory that goes to country L, y˜(αL, αR), depends negatively on country L
′s
conflict costs (HL) but positively on country R
′s conflict costs (HR) . The magnitude of
such effects increases as the discount factor δ approaches one. The reason is that what the
bargainers obtain if they fail to reach an agreement is proportional to the conflict costs. Hence,(
1−δn
1−δ
)
Hi can be seen as implicit gains (costs avoided) from reaching an agreement. The
higher are the costs avoided (i.e., the higher is Hi) the lower share of land is obtained in
the agreement. This effect is reversed when we consider the conflict costs of the opponent
country. Moreover, y˜ also depends positively on country L′s bargaining power (αL). A
similar interpretation can be given to the share of the interval [0, 1] that goes to country R,
1− y˜(αL, αR).
We consider that the bargaining power of country i = L, R, αi, is given by the relative weight
of country i′s public statement with respect to the sum of both countries’ statements. This
assumption highlights the importance of pre-bargaining claims in further negotiation and is
central to our analysis. Specifically, we assume that: αL =
xL
xL+1−xR , and αR =
1−xR
xL+1−xR .
Therefore, the Nash bargaining outcome as a function of the pre bargaining public statements
is given by
y(xL, xR) =
xL
xL + 1− xR (1− dRn) +
1− xR
xL + 1− xR dLn. (4)
A quick inspection to Eq.(4) reveals that, for any given xR, HR, HL and δ, function y is
increasing and concave in xL. By symmetry, the same occurs to 1− y with respect to 1− xR.
4. Bayesian Nash equilibrium statements
This section is devoted to analyze the equilibrium values for the pre-bargaining claims made
by the countries in conflict. These equilibrium values depend on parameters such as the
conflict costs (Hi), the duration of the conflict if no agreement is reached after negotiation (n)
and the discount factor (δ), and they also depend on the stationary value for the social welfare
(Wi). In order to obtain closed solutions and simplify calculus, we compute the equilibrium
outcome under the assumption that the players are symmetric.
9 Observe that the threat point varies as a function of parameters δ, H and n. We are only concerned on
the effects of such changes on the Nash bargaining solution. To see how the influence of the threat point
on the bargaining outcome varies across different type of solutions, see Anbarci et. al (2002).
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We assume that threshold T is uncertain. This assumption reflects the parties’ lack of
knowledge of each other’s response to any given territory claim. The threshold is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, 1], and this distribution is common knowledge. Any given
realization of T represents a measure of the ex-ante probability of negotiation abortion. For
instance, if T is close to zero, the probability that negotiations don’t take place in this period
is close to one. However, the realization of T is not known to the parties before they announce
their positions.
The setting described above can be analyzed as a Bayesian game, in which the players’
strategies are the public statements and the payoff of player i = L, R, at the beginning of
period t is given by Ui(xL, xR) = vui [y(xL, xR)] + (1 − v)di1, where v = 1 represents a
bargaining process leading to outcome y(xL, xR), and v = 0 means that the conflict persists (at
least) during period t. Provided that T ∼ U [0, 1], the probability of conflict in period t, after
the public statements (xL, xR) are made, can be expressed as:
p (xL, xR) = Pr(v = 0 | xL, xR) = xL − xR. (5)
The probability that negotiations are held in period t is then given by 1− p (xL, xR) .
Uncertainty about the exact value of the threshold induces the following strategic situation:
more extreme positions tend to favour a better outcome in a negotiation process, but as
the players move towards the extremes the probability of aborting the negotiation process
increases. Each player faces a trade off similar to the one faced by the bidders in a first price
auction: A lower price is better if one gets the good, but lowering the price also lowers the
probability of obtaining the good. Therefore, if a player makes a very tough public statement
(to create a stronger bargaining position), negotiations hardly take place. We seek to analyze
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium statements that emerge in this context.
The timing of this game is as follows: (i) players simultaneously announce bargaining
positions xL and xR; (ii) the threshold is realized; (iii) each player receives his payoff. We
look for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game, defined as a pair of statements (x̂L, x̂R)
such that x̂L = arg max{xL} E [UL(xL, x̂R)] and x̂R = arg max{xR} E [UR(x̂L, xR)] , where
E [UL(xL, x̂R)] = p (xL, x̂R) dL1 + θL [1− p (xL, x̂R)] y(xL, x̂R), (6)
and
E [UR(x̂L, xR)] = p (x̂L, xR) dR1 + θR [1− p (x̂L, xR)] [1− y(x̂L, xR)] . (7)
The first order condition obtained from maximizing E [UL(xL, x̂R)] with respect to xL implies
the following equation:
θL [1− p (xL, x̂R)] ∂y(xL, x̂R)
∂xL
= [θLy(xL, x̂R)− dL1] ∂p (xL, x̂R)
∂xL
. (8)
If country L reports a higher xL, the probability that negotiations are held decrease, but the
piece of territory obtained in case negotiations take place is higher. Therefore, Eq. (8) above
represents the equality between the marginal costs of increasing xL (right hand term) and the
marginal benefits of doing so (left hand term). The first order condition
∂E[UR(x̂L ,xR)]
∂xR
= 0
admits the same interpretation.
From Eq. (8) it is implicit that Wi is treated as an exogenous parameter. The reason is that
Wi represents the welfare at the beginning of the present period (t) and it also represents the
208 Social Welfare
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welfare at the beginning of the next period (t + 1) . If changing the statements xL and xR could
change the equilibrium value of Wi, say to W
′
i = Wi, then the stationary value of the social
welfare would be W ′i throughout all periods. The players, who are aware of the dynamics of
the game, take the value of Wi as given.
Solving Eq. (8) for xL we obtain xL(x̂R), the reaction function of country L to every possible
given statement x̂R. A similar routine leads us to xR(x̂L), the reaction function of country R
to any given x̂L. In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the pair of statements (x̂L, x̂R) is such that
x̂L = xL(x̂R) and x̂R = xR(x̂L).
In order to provide an explicit expression for the pair (x̂L, x̂R) we now make some symmetry
assumptions. In particular, we assume that both countries are identical in their valuations of
territory and in the conflict costs. Namely, θL = θR = θ and HL = HR = H. In this scenario,
we have x̂L = 1− x̂R. Then, it follows that WL = WR = W and hence dLn = dRn = dn. In a
symmetric equilibrium we have x̂L = x
∗(n, H, W) and x̂R = 1− x∗(n, H, W). We use Eq. (8)
above to compute
x∗(n, H, W) = θ [1− 2dn(H, W)]
2 [θ(1− dn(H, W))− d1(H, W)] . (9)
Next we analyze the dependence of x∗(.) on parameters H and n. We simplify notation by
writing x∗ instead of x∗(n, H, W) and dn instead of dn(H, W). Using the expression for x∗ in
Eq. (9) we compute
dx∗
dH
=
∂x∗
∂dn
∂dn
∂H︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect
+
∂x∗
∂H︸︷︷︸
Direct effect
where ∂x
∗
∂dn
= − θ2+2θd1
2[θ(1−dn)−d1]2
, ∂dn
∂H = −
(
1−δn
1−δ
)
< 0, and ∂x
∗
∂H =
−θ[1−2dn ]
2[θ(1−dn)−d1]2
.
The indirect effect reflects the equilibrium reaction of the pre-bargaining claim to an increase
in conflict costs through the influence that such costs have on the disagreement point. Under
the mild assumption that θ + 2H > 2δW (i.e. if conflict costs are high enough, and/or the
valuation of land is high enough, and/or the discount factor is low enough), the derivative
∂x∗
∂dn
is negative. Therefore, the indirect effect is positive provided that ∂dn
∂H < 0.
The direct effect operates in the opposite direction. If the conflict costs increase, and the
disagreement point dn is low enough
10, then the threat of a conflict dissuades from making
aggressive statements (e.g. to claim the entire territory). In general, it cannot be established
whether the direct effect predominates or not over the indirect effect. We show later, in a
more restricted context, that the response of the equilibrium claims to a change in H is non
monotone. Specifically, x∗ is decreasing if H is low enough and increasing if H is high enough.
If the parties disagree in negotiations, the conflict lasts for n periods. Next we analyze the
influence of parameter n in the behavior of the parties before negotiations. In particular, we
compute the sign of dx
∗
dn .
dx∗
dn
=
∂x∗
∂dn
∂dn
∂n
.
10 It is required that dn <
1
2 . Observe that for this inequality to hold it is sufficient that 1 + 2H > 2δW,
provided that dn < −H + δW for n ≥ 2.
209ocial Welfare and the Emergence of Negotiations
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From Eq. (2) we know that ∂dn
∂n < 0. We also know that
∂x∗
∂dn
< 0 whenever θ + 2H > 2δW.
Hence, we can establish that dx
∗
dn > 0, i.e., the share of territory initially claimed is larger if n
increases (and so do the costs from disagreement).
The likelihood of being in conflict during period t is also affected by changes in H and n.
Evaluated at equilibrium, this probability is given by p∗ = p (x∗, 1− x∗) = 2x∗ − 1. Hence,
dp∗
dH = 2
dx∗
dH and
dp∗
dn = 2
dx∗
dn > 0. If the utility obtained in case of disagreement lowers (higher
n), the probability of conflict increases. This effect becomes apparent in the next section, in
which we investigate the relationship between p∗ and H under different values of n.
Let us now focus our attention on the equilibrium value for the generalized Nash bargaining
outcome. First, observe that in our symmetric framework it holds that x̂L = 1 − x̂R = x∗.
Then, the bargaining power of both countries is the same, i.e., α∗L =
x̂L
x̂L+1−x̂R =
x∗
2x∗ =
1
2 , and
α∗R =
1−x̂R
x̂L+1−x̂R =
x∗
2x∗ =
1
2 . Plugging these values into Eq. (4) we obtain y(x̂L, x̂R) =
1
2 (1 −
dn) +
1
2 dn =
1
2 . Not surprisingly, the Nash bargaining solution evaluated at the equilibrium
statements involves that the territory is equally shared between both countries.
It is worth mentioning that the equilibrium statements computed above eventually depend
on the equilibrium value for W. We derive endogenously the stationary value of W in the next
section.
5. Social welfare, conflict, and the emergence of negotiations
The purpose of this section is twofold: First, it is devoted to compute the welfare expected
from the equilibrium play of the game at the beginning of each period. Secondly, it includes
estimations on the way how x∗ and p∗ respond to H under different scenarios (n = 1, n = 2
and n → ∞).
The value for W is implicitly defined in the following expression:
W = E {UL [x∗(n, H, W), 1− x∗(n, H, W)]} . (10)
In order to solve Eq. (10) above for W, we use the probability of conflict at equilibrium, given
by:
p∗ = d1 − θdn
θ(1− dn)− d1 . (11)
Taking into account that y(x∗, 1− x∗) = 12 , we rewrite Eq. (10) as:
W = p∗d1 + (1− p∗)12 . (12)
Plugging the expression for p∗ in Eq. (11) into Eq. (12) we obtain:
W =
(d1 − 1− θdn) d1 + θ2
θ(1− dn)− d1 . (13)
We just need to substitute d1 = −H + δW and dn = −
(
1−δn
1−δ
)
H + δnW in Eq. (13) and solve
it for W. In order to provide a tractable expression for the social welfare, we assume specific
210 Social Welfare
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values for parameters θ and δ. Namely, θ = 1 and δ = 0.5. Then, we write:
W =
(d1 − dn − 1) d1 + 12
1− dn − d1 . (14)
Next we discuss how the social welfare varies when n changes. In particular we study the
cases where n = 1 (case 1), n = 2 (case 2), and n → ∞ (case 3). Case 1 corresponds to a
situation in which the players receive the payoffs associated with the status quo when they
fail to reach an agreement. Cases 2 and 3 should be interpreted as if players had an outside
option whose effects imply facing n additional periods of conflict. For each case, we compute
both the equilibrium statement x∗ and the probability of conflict p∗ as a function of the conflict
costs H.
We obtain that in case 1 the social welfare is constant, but in cases 2 and 3, it is strictly
decreasing in H. The effect of H on x∗ and p∗ is non monotonic in cases 2 and 3. For low
values of H, the statement x∗ is decreasing in H. It reaches a minimum, and then increases in
H and converges asymptotically to a constant value. As long as p∗ = 2x∗ − 1, the response of
p∗ to changes in H follows a similar pattern.
We can also calculate how long will the conflict last, for different values of H. Notice
that, if p∗ is the probability of conflict in period t, the number of periods of conflict
(until a negotiation process is undertaken) is a random variable Y that follows a geometric
distribution. Specifically, the probability that there are k periods of conflict is given by
Pr(Y = k) = (p∗)k (1− p∗), and the expected value of Y is E(Y) = p∗1−p∗ . Below we compute
p∗ as a function of H for the cases n = 1, n = 2 and n → ∞, with θ = 1 and δ = 0.5. Then,
we estimate the number of periods the conflict is expected to last as a function of H for each
given value of n. Moreover, the expected cost of a conflict can also be computed as E(Y)H.
5.1 Case 1 (n = 1)
In this case, dn = d1 = −H + δW. This means that the utility achieved if negotiations break
down is equal to the utility achieved in the case that negotiations do not take place and
the conflict situation persists along period t. The probability of conflict (Eq. (11)) is zero11
provided that the equilibrium statements are equal to 12 (the reader can check it in Eq. (9)).
Then, by Eq. (14) we obtain W = 12 .
It is worth to mention that neither the pre-bargaining claims nor the social welfare are affected
by the conflict costs H. This is due to the fact that such costs exert exactly the same influence
on the two possible outcomes (conflict or negotiation) that may arise after xL and xR are
announced and the threshold T is realized. In the first case (conflict), the payoff for each
country is −H + δW. The Nash bargaining outcome is y = 12 , and in case of disagreement the
parties would obtain d1 = −H + δW. This means that, if the parties broke down negotiations,
the disagreement payoffs would equal the cost of suffering conflict during one more period.
In equilibrium, both parties claim one half of the territory, a negotiation process emerges with
probability one, and each country enjoys a social welfare equal to 12 . The territory is equally
shared and there is no conflict. The expected number of periods the conflict will last is zero,
and the expected cost of the conflict is also zero. As we show below, both the likelihood of a
11 Observe this probability could be greater than zero if we considered θ > d11−d1 .
211ocial Welfare and the Emergence of Negotiations
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negotiation process to emerge and the social welfare are dependent on the conflict costs when
n ≥ 2.
5.2 Case 2 (n = 2)
In this scenario, we have dn = d2 = −(1 + δ)H + δ2W. A conflict in period t involves costs H,
but the emergence of a negotiation process opens the possibility of ending up with an outcome
which is even worse. This outcome occurs if the parties fail to reach an agreement. Then, the
payoff to each country is d2 < d1. Comparing it with the former case, we should expect that
now each country claims for more than one half of the territory. Therefore, the probability of
conflict must be positive.
From Eq. (14) we write the following expression for the social welfare:
W =
(d1 − d2 − 1) d1 + 12
1− d2 − d1 . (15)
If we substitute d1 = −H + δW and d2 = −(1 + δ)H + δ2W and δ = 0.5 into Eq. (15) above,
we obtain:
W =
(0.25W + 0.5H) (−H + 0.5W) + 12
1 + 2.5H − 0.75W (16)
There are two values of W that satisfy Eq. (16), but only one of them satisfies our assumption
that θ + 2H > 2δW. This value is:
W = 1. 428 6H − 0.571 43
[(
5H + 8H2 − 3
4
) 1
2 − 1
]
. (17)
Notice12 that dWdH
∣∣∣
n=2
< 0 for all H ≥ 18 .
The stationary value for the social welfare decreases in response to an increase in the conflict
costs. The rationale behind this effect is as follows: If H increases, the disagreement utility
becomes lower. This makes a negotiation process be less attractive for the countries, as long
as the "bad outcome" of conflict today is not so bad compared to the disagreement outcome
(two periods of conflict). As a consequence, the countries are willing to make more aggressive
statements. This behavior decreases the probability of negotiations to emerge. Therefore, the
social welfare falls to a lower level.
Next we check that the equilibrium statements are higher than 12 . For this purpose, we
substitute the value for the social welfare in Eq. (16) into Eq. (9) to obtain:
x∗ = 1
2
1 + 3H − 0.5W
1 + 2.5H − 0.75W . (18)
From Eq. (18) it is straightforward that x∗ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
provided that H > 0, W > 0 and
1 + 2H > W for all H ≥ 18 . The fact that x∗ > 12 implies p∗ = 2x∗ − 1 > 0. An important
conclusion is that if n = 2, and H ≥ 18 the probability that countries continue with the
conflict instead of initiating a negotiation process is positive. This result is in accordance with
12 A solution for W exists whenever H /∈
(
− 34 , 18
)
.
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the observed evidence that even if there is room for a mutually advantageous negotiation,
equilibrium statements may abort the emergence of the process.
Now we compute the equilibrium value of x∗ as a function of the conflict costs. By substituting
W in Eq. (17) into Eq. (18) we obtain:
x∗ = 1
2
1 + 2. 285 7H + 0.285 72
((
5H + 8H2 − 34
) 1
2 − 1
)
1 + 1. 428 5H + 0.428 57
((
5H + 8H2 − 34
) 1
2 − 1
) (19)
It is easy to check that x∗ is strictly decreasing in H across the range (0.125, 0.569 5) . The
minimum value of x∗ is 0.569 5, taken at H = 0.572 87. In this case, p∗ = 0.139, and the
conflict is expected to last 0.161 44 periods. The expected cost of the conflict is 0.09 248 4. The
maximum statement is made when H = 0.125. This statement is equal to 0.666 67, associated
with a probability of conflict of 0.333 34. In this case, the expected number of periods of conflict
is 0.5, and the expected cost of the conflict is 0.062 5. When H → ∞, we have x∗ → 0.585 79.
The probability of conflict is 0.171 58 and the expected duration of the conflict is 0.207 12.
5.3 Case 3 (n → ∞)
In this third case, we have that lim
n→∞−
(
1−δn
1−δ
)
H + δnW = − 11−δ H. We are dealing with the
somehow extreme situation in which breaking down negotiations involves that conflict will
last forever. We substitute dn = − 11−δ H into Eq. (14) to obtain:
W =
0.25W2 − H2 + 12
1 + 3H − 0.5W . (20)
Solving Eq. (20) for W yields:
W = 2H − 2
3
[
2
(
3
2
H + 3H2 − 1
8
) 1
2 − 1
]
. (21)
It is easy to see that dWdH
∣∣∣
n→∞ < 0 for all H ≥
1
12
√
15 − 14 . Moreover, for all H ≥ 18 it holds
that dWdH
∣∣∣
n→∞ <
dW
dH
∣∣∣
n=2
< 0. This suggests that the magnitude of the social welfare losses
provoked by an increase in the conflict costs becomes higher as n grows large. Compared
to the two former cases, notice that now the disagreement point does not depend on W.
Therefore, the effect of an increase in the conflict costs can be easily computed as a variation
of magnitude − 11−δ in the disagreement utility.
The equilibrium statements are now:
x∗ = 1
2
1 + 4H
1 + 3H − 0.5W . (22)
We have that x∗ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
whenever H > −0.5W. By substituting W (Eq. (21)) in the latter
inequality we find that it holds for values of H such that 6H > 2
(
3
2 H + 3H
2 − 18
) 1
2 − 1. This
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inequality is satisfied by all H ≥ 112
√
15− 14 = 0.07 274 9. Hence, for conflict costs above this
value, the probability of conflict is positive, i.e., p∗ > 0. Now we compute the equilibrium
value for x∗ by substituting W in Eq. (21) into Eq. (22) to obtain:
x∗ = 1
2
1 + 4H
1 + 2H + 13
(
2
(
3
2 H + 3H
2 − 18
) 1
2 − 1
) . (23)
The equilibrium statement x∗ is above 0.75 for low values of H, is decreasing in H across
the range (0.07 274 9, 0.540 57), and reaches a minimum value of 0.612 57 at H = 0.540 57.
For H > 0.540 57, x∗ is strictly increasing and converges asymptotically to 0.633 97. The
probability of conflict now varies between 0.587 44 (when H = 0.07275 and x∗ = 0.793 72)
and 0.225 14 (when H = 0.540 57 and x∗ = 0.612 57). For H large enough, the probability of
conflict is constant and equal to 0.267 94. The expected duration of the conflict ranges from 1.
423 9 periods (for H = 0.07275) to 0.290 56 periods (for H = 0.540 57). The expected conflict
cost is then 0.103 59 if H = 0.07275, and 0.157 07 if H = 0.540 57.
In general, when analyzing the effects of variations in H on the probability of conflict, we are
able to conclude that, in cases where n > 1: (i) p∗ achieves a maximum when the conflict
costs are minimum13; (ii) p∗ achieves a minimum for a certain value of H; (iii) p∗ converges
to a constant value as H → ∞. The pattern of variation of p∗ is driven by the way how the
equilibrium statement x∗ changes in response to H.
Therefore, tough public pronouncements are expected to be made when the conflict costs are
minimum. From that point on, the claims moderate as H grows large. There is a certain value
of H that yields the lowest equilibrium claim (i.e., the highest probability that negotiations
emerge). When H is large enough, the claims tend to a constant value.
As the above analysis reveals, favoring the own position with aggressive claims can either be
the product of extremely low or extremely high conflict costs. In the first case, the countries
find it profitable to take the risk of aborting a negotiation process, as long as the benefits of
a higher bargaining power in future negotiations outweigh the costs of facing conflict today.
For the second case, it must be considered that failure to reach an agreement in negotiations
involves a certain persistence of the conflict (during n ≥ 1 periods) and then high values of
H lower considerably the disagreement utilities. Clearly, the worse outcome is represented
by the disagreement point, the less attractive is a negotiation process. Then, strong public
pronouncements that lower the probability of negotiations should not come as a surprise.
6. Conclusions
This chapter studies the relationship between social welfare, the cost of conflict and the
emergence of a negotiation process. For this purpose, we develop a model in which two
countries are bargaining over a fixed size territory. While no agreement is reached, the parties
keep engaged in a conflict that entails costs in each period. The countries have the ability
to make public statements representing claims over the territory. If the claims are not "too
extreme", a negotiation process emerges that yields as an outcome the generalized Nash
bargaining solution, where the bargaining power of each country is conditioned upon the
previous claims. The disagreement point of this negotiation process is to face conflict during
13 These results are in line with that of Wittman (1979), who finds that a reduction of hostilities may reduce
the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war
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an indeterminate number of periods (ranging from 1 to infinite). On the other hand, if the
public statements are far enough from each other, then no negotiation process emerges and
the conflict continues for at least one more period. As a difference with previous work, conflict
is not considered as a bargaining instrument. Instead, conflict is the prevailing state, which can
only be changed if the parties make diplomatic efforts (concessions, in the form of reasonable
claims) to resolve the dispute through a pacific settlement.
In this setting we conclude that, in general, the probability of conflict in period t is a non
monotonic function of the conflict costs. For low costs it is decreasing, and it increases when
costs are above a certain value. At this particular value, the probability of conflict reaches a
minimum. A similar pattern is obtained with respect to the pre-bargaining equilibrium claims.
The effect of conflict costs on the social welfare is more clear: it decreases monotonically as
the conflict costs increase.
These results suggest that the goals of maximizing the social welfare and minimizing the
probability of conflict are not equivalent, since both are achieved at different levels of conflict
costs. While the welfare is maximum when conflict is costless, the likelihood of a negotiation
process to emerge achieves a maximum for positive conflict costs. Moreover, if such costs are
very high, the probability of conflict achieves a constant value. This explains why in some
instances a negotiation process does not emerge, even if it would be in the interest of the
conflicting parties to initiate it. Although countries must bear certain costs every period the
conflict lasts, they face even higher costs if negotiations emerge but no agreement is reached.
The countries trade-off the conflict costs (today) against the expected outcome of negotiations,
and therefore they make public statements that may involve the persistence of the conflict.
The utility reached at the disagreement point when negotiations break down is a crucial
element to determine the probability of such negotiations to emerge. In our model, the threat
point is parameterized by "n", the number of periods the conflict will last if no agreement is
reached. The analysis made in Section 5 reveals that the social welfare depends negatively
on "n" for any given conflict cost. It is then desirable that the threat point of a negotiation
process is not too harmful for the parties in conflict. This implies that an important issue in the
design of the rules of a negotiation process should be to prevent and limit the consequences of
breaking negotiations. Specifically, before the bargaining over territory takes place, it would
be welfare enhancing that the parties could commit to restart negotiations at an early date in
case no agreement were reached. In general, any measure conducive to mitigate the negative
outcome represented by the threat point would improve the likelihood of achieving a pacific
settlement through negotiation.
If the countries could choose the intensity of the dispute, our model suggests that a moderate
investment in resources devoted to the conflict proves optimal for a negotiation process to
emerge. This conclusion is compatible with the approach that envisions conflict as part of a
bargaining strategy, as in Sanchez-Pagés (2009). According to this view, the nations engaged
in territorial disputes use limited confrontation as a way to convey information about their
relative strength. The information revealed facilitates the emergence of a peaceful outcome.
In our model, though, the line of explanation is a bit different. When conflict costs are positive,
but not too high, the parties might find it beneficial to negotiate as long as the threat point in
case of disagreement does not entail huge utility losses. However, if conflict costs become
higher (for instance, if the countries engage in a nuclear arms race), then the threat point
involves a final confrontation aimed to the absolute destruction of the enemy. We have shown
that the territorial claims in this case tend to be more aggressive, thus lowering the probability
of reaching a negotiated outcome.
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Further research should focus on the public good nature of negotiation processes. Once the
process is underway, no agent can be excluded from its benefits. Moreover, taking part in
negotiations does not exclude other agents of being engaged in the process. Provision of
the public good “negotiation” is clearly efficient, as long as the conflicting parties obtain a
mutual benefit. However, contributing to this public good (i.e. making diplomatic efforts
in the form of less demanding pre-bargaining claims) is a strategic decision plagued by
the free rider problem. Interpreting the emergence of negotiations as a game of voluntary
contributions, allow us to conclude that, in general, negotiations are under-provided. This
view of the problem allows for a mechanism design solution to resolve international disputes
over territory.
7. Acknowledgements
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through MEC/FEDER
grant ECO2010-21624 is gratefully acknowledged.
8. References
[1] Anbarci, N., Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C. (2002). Comparing Bargaining Solutions in
the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects, Journal of
Economic Theory Vol. 106: 1-16.
[2] Ausubel, L.M., Cramton, P.C., & Deneckere, R. J. (2002). Bargaining with incomplete
information, in R. J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds)., Handbook of Game Theory, Elsevier
Science, Amsterdam, pp. 1897–945.
[3] Binmore, K. (1987). Nash bargaining theory, in K. Binmore, P. Dasgupta (eds.), The
Economics of Bargaining, Blackwell, New York, pp. 27-46.
[4] Cramton, P.C. & Tracy, J.S. (1992). Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: theory and
data, American Economic Review Vol. 82 (No 1): 100–21.
[5] Croson, R., Boles, T. & Murnighan, J.K. (2003). Cheap talk in bargaining experiments:
lying and threats in ultimatum games, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Vol. 51:
143–159.
[6] Fearon, J.D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war, International Organization Vol. 49:
379-415.
[7] Harsanyi, J.C. & Selten, R. (1972). A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person
Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information, Management Science Vol. 18 (No. 5):
80-106.
[8] Kennan, J. & Wilson, R. (1993). Bargaining with Private Information, Journal of Economic
Literature Vol. 31 (No. 1): 45-104.
[9] Muthoo, A. (1996). A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic, Journal of
Economic Theory Vol. 69: 134-152
[10] Osborne, M.J., & Rubinstein, A. (1990). Bargaining and Markets. San Diego: Academic.
[11] Powell, R. (2002). Bargaining Theory and International Conflict, Annual Review of Political
Science, Vol. 5:1–30.
[12] Sánchez-Pagés, S. (2009). Conflict as part of the bargaining process, The Economic Journal
Vol. 119: 1189–1207.
[13] Schelling, T.C. (1956). An essay on bargaining, The American Economic Review Vol. 46 (No.
3): 281-306.
[14] Wittman D. (1979). How a war ends: a rational model approach, Journal of Conflict
Resolution Vol. 23: 743–63
216 Social Welfare
www.intechopen.com
Social Welfare
Edited by Dr. Rosario Laratta
ISBN 978-953-51-0208-3
Hard cover, 216 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 07, March, 2012
Published in print edition March, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
"Social Welfare" offers, for the first time, a wide-ranging, internationally-focused selection of cutting-edge work
from leading academics. Its interdisciplinary approach and comparative perspective promote examination of
the most pressing social welfare issues of the day. The book aims to clarify some of the ambiguity around the
term, discuss the pros and cons of privatization, present a range of social welfare paradoxes and innovations,
and establish a clear set of economic frameworks with which to understand the conditions under which the
change in social welfare can be obtained.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Francisco Candel-Sánchez (2012). Social Welfare and the Emergence of Negotiations, Social Welfare, Dr.
Rosario Laratta (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0208-3, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/social-welfare/social-welfare-and-the-emergence-of-negotiations
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
